Now, if D.F. took her experience of music to be veridical, then, what are we to conclude: that consciousness (always, most of the time, occasionally) misrepresents its own operations? How can a phenomenological approach to experience, which relies on the distinction between the 'physical' object (air vibrations) and the object as intended (the auditory phenomenon of 'music'), help us here?
If, on Merleau-Ponty's use of the phenomenological method, every looking-at must be accompanied by a corresponding looking-for, how exactly can we correlate first-person phenomenology with third-person cognitive science? When I look at a calm sea and imagine huge waves I find myself looking for waves in precisely the same way as I were to look at the sea expecting it to be churning (as though a hurricane were approaching). Can you look at a PET or fMRI scan of the brain in such a way that your theoretical assumptions are wholly bracketed? Or, to make it a bit easier, can you gaze at your sweetheart in such a way that the fact that you are always already attracted to her/him does not affect your perception?
If, on Merleau-Ponty's use of the phenomenological method, every looking-at must be accompanied by a corresponding looking-for, how exactly can we correlate first-person phenomenology with third-person cognitive science? When I look at a calm sea and imagine huge waves I find myself looking for waves in precisely the same way as I were to look at the sea expecting it to be churning (as though a hurricane were approaching). Can you look at a PET or fMRI scan of the brain in such a way that your theoretical assumptions are wholly bracketed? Or, to make it a bit easier, can you gaze at your sweetheart in such a way that the fact that you are always already attracted to her/him does not affect your perception?
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When Merleau-Ponty states “every looking-at must be accompanied by a corresponding looking-for, then how exactly can we correlate first-person phenomenology with third-person cognitive science” (Meleau-Ponty)? It seems there is a sort of intention there. By Coseru’s example, if every time you look at the sea and it is calm, then the next time you look at the sea you would expect it to be calm. However, if you are used to seeing a rough sea, then you will expect the sea to be rough. However, if the sea is sometimes rough and sometimes calm when you look at it, then you do not know what to expect. There is a type of intention when looking at the sea. Someone is looking for the sea to be a particular way. “Can you look at a PET or fMRI scan of the brain in such a way that your theoretical assumptions are wholly bracketed?”(Coseru question) I suppose the assumptions are bracketed because even if “you gaze at your sweetheart in such a way that the fact that you are always already attracted to her/him does not affect your perception?” (Coseru) This statement would be true. Chalmers states “Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C” (BCC 226). Maybe because we intend that the color “deep blue” will appear to us the same way each time, or the fact that we “navigate the world through facial expressions”(powerpoint) the facial expressions are the same each time. When someone is angry we recognize what “angry” looks like, and or “happiness” we recognize what that looks like. Maybe everything just has a certain pattern in this way? Maybe it is due to how the neurons in our brain respond to certain situations for example, being happy or angry?
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