Friday, January 23, 2009

How much is phenomenal consciousness worth?

Selmer Bringsjord (see reference bellow) raises some important questions in his exploration of the (moral?) dilemma of whether or not to accept a billion dollar contract for producing a mere 'proof-of-concept' robot capable of phenomenal consciousness: first, what would a SOW (Statement of Work) outlining the research & development of the project look like (all that's necessary simply to get half the money and get started))? second, why, if truly honest, one must decline such an offer; and third, even in a distant future when robots indistinguishable from humans both physically and sensorimotor-wise could become a reality, the question of whether they have phenomenal consciousness (and not merely physical and behavioral resemblance) still remains.

Bringsjord is rather candid in his assessment of human motivation (at least in certain quarters of Consciousness Studies) when it comes to such ridiculously large sums of money: sure, some researches will write a proposal, grab the money and run! But, as he tells us, "these are not nice people." And precisely how would researches of a future world already 'populated' by androids, look upon such a proposal?

If behaving in a certain way is having qualia, then one may justifiably grab the billion dollars offer now. But it's not: at best, it's as if having qualia. How much might a 'proof-of-concept' robot with phenomenal consciousness rake in the future (with appropriate adjustments for inflation) is anyone's guess. But if anyone thinks that such a robot would have life and feelings and a sense of what is it like to undergo certain experiences, then obviously that person (Shanahan et. al.) does not fully understand that phenomenal consciousness is not reducible to activation patterns of the brain's neural architecture nor any simulation thereof.

Source: Bringsjord, Selmer, "Offer: One Billion Dollars for a Conscious Robot; If You're Honest, You Must Decline," Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14, No. 7, 2007, pp. 28-43.

No comments:

Post a Comment

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.