Wednesday, February 11, 2009
Being-in-the-womb
Following on from our discussion of infant and pre- and perinatal consciousness, this is what Hubert Dreyfus has to say about Heidegger's understanding of when human beings can be properly said to begin to exist: "...human beings begin to exist in Heidegger's
special sense of existence only after the first few weeks. They begin to
exist as they are
socialized into the understanding of what it is to be a human being that
is already contained in
social practices" (Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1991, p. 23). Amanda is curious to find out what all of you think about whether or not the idea of prenatal consciousness is reconcilable with Heidegger's concept of the Dasein? Does the embryo in the womb count as a being-in-the-world, given that for it the womb is the world?
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I am not familiar with heidegger's "special sense of existence," however, if he believes this sense to be a consequence of socialization with other humans then the existence of prenatal consciousness seems to show that he is mistake. However, a supporter of heidegger's view may be able to argue otherwise. One option, is to claim that the interpretation of the data as supporting prenatal consciousness is incorrect. The behavioral responses and the neurological development may simply be consistent with a non-conscious functional system. That is, a system that combines external stimuli with internal states to generate behavioral outputs.
ReplyDeleteA second option (and this is where it gets spotty since I haven't read heidegger) is to claim that while the infant may have some sense of awareness and thus be conscious in a weak sense (i.e. awake and not in a coma) it cannot have the "special sense of existence" that is part of being a socialized being in the world.
An embryo in the womb does count as a being-in-the-world. Even though the embryo is not in the social world outside of the womb does not mean it is not a being- in- the -world. The being is still sentient and based on the discussion at “eight weeks networks are shaped by some systems of sub cortical brain that will select and evaluate experience throughout life. While at 20 weeks twins touch each other inside the womb” (Powerpoint presentation on BBC chapter 3). So, even inside the womb the embryo is conscious and is having experiences from a first person phenomenological perspective. Based on Husserl intentionality is important for consciousness referencing PPM 68. There is still“about-ness” to the embryo’s experience because the embryo can at certain weeks “touch and feel” having senses to navigate the world. Is socializing in an outside world any different than having senses as an embryo? Couldn’t a ten year old human living in the world be a being-in-the-world just as much as an embryo inside the womb? In both situations the human and the embryo are able to feel his or her surroundings whether it is painful, comforting, cold, etc.
ReplyDeleteJust to clarify the first point of my original post, I do not think that a supporter of heidegger's view would except functionalist accounts of consciousness. However, since a developing fetus lacks the "socialization" that seems to be necessary to exist in heideggers special way and the data presented in the infant consciousness essay seems to support infant consciousness I simply want to suggest that supporters of heideggers view may be able to acknowledge that while the fetus is still developing its neurological hardware is "exploring" its own capabilities. For a concrete example of what i mean see the link below:
ReplyDeletehttp://ricardo.strangevistas.net/starfish-robot-learning-to-walk.html
While heidegger would deny the starfish in the video a first person consciousness, it seems that the robot is learning in a sense. Instead of biting the bullet and admitting that socialization may not be necessary for being in the world, the phenomenologist may claim that the developing brain is acting in a similar manner to the starfish exploring its own capacities.
I believe Ms. Capano has adequately made a case for a pre-natal, phenomenological consciousness to be the case. Though in order to fully meet the requirements for existence in Heidegger’s special sense, we need to add the social aspect that is critical to his notion. As rendered by Dreyfus, this is, again, Heidegger’s account of the necessary requirements for a Dasein to exist, “They begin to exist as they are socialized into the understanding of what it is to be a human being that is already contained in social practices” (Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1991, p. 23).
ReplyDeleteThis socialization starts before birth. In Trevarthen and Reddy’s article “Consciousness in Infants” they find that “Fetuses hear from 20 weeks, and tests of babies’ recognition of their mother’s voice immediately after birth prove that a baby can distinguish her speech or singing from that of another woman” (Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 53). Thus, the fetus has all ready begun to internalize the mother’s manner of being-in-the-world through exposure to her speech patterns and those with whom she interacts. Therefore we now have, added to the intentionality ascribed by Ms. Capano above, the adequate cultural and social aspects in order to constitute a Dasein. The pre-natal baby is being introduced to one facet of its soon-to-be social existence in much the same way as the ‘Japanese Baby’ is being acclimated by its immediate surroundings in the world.
Continuing on Nicole's point above, I also agree that an embryo in the womb could count as "being-in-the-world." Although Heidegger may believe that socialism is necessary in order to 'be-in-the-world,' could it not be interpreted that the external stimuli to the embryo could be an account of socialization? When mothers place music to their belly in hopes to calm, or create an atmosphere for the embryo does this not count, if at the very least, as precursors to socialization? However, when can it be determined that an embryo experiences "being-in-the-world" does this occur when it can first react to any external stimuli, or is there a point in time during the embryo's life that allows for this experience to become real for the embryo? And if the latter is the case can we truly claim that the embryo is in the world if only during part of it's' existence? Can the embryo truly experience life in a phenomenal aspect? I guess I can see both sides of the argument.
ReplyDeleteI think Heidegger would not concede any sufficient measure of "that special kind of existence" to prenatal embryos or fetuses. For one, I think it is necessary in his conception that the world in which we are being, as Dasein, is a primarily social world. Also, it seems that the unborn baby is not as consumed in "activity" as a child might be. Now, the twin case might be an exception, as twins in the womb might at least have each other by which to reference for self-interpretation on a minimal level, but this lacks the aspect of social practices. Heidegger mentions at some point that we gain so much of our sense of being-in-the-world by how we interact with and (on some level) emulate others (in action, speech, representation, fluidity, gesture, tone, etc).
ReplyDeleteNow, one might posit a woodland hermit as somewhat of an objection to the necessity of situatedness-in-society in Dasein. But this hermit still at one point was situated in society and chose his way of being, as an outsider. The embryo or fetus does not have this fundamental choice in its mode of being. It can develop senses in the womb that are eventually needed to acquire the full sense of being-in-the-world, such as phenomenal aspects of comfort, hunger, security, warmth, etc., but this does not automatically grant it the (being-in-the-world) sense that it is eventually to acquire in Dasein's world. I feel that unborn babies are too "caught up" in the necessary processes of survival and development, and they have no reference to casual occurrences (especially the being of others) from which they can reflect and interpret themselves as beings.
However, B.A. Waring makes an excellent point about the baby's recognition of it's mother's voice upon birth to suggest at least a partial element of prenatal socialization which must be considered. On the other hand, I still hold that this is missing so many more social and practical elements (like the idea of coping that we discussed) that it cannot be considered as the full ideal of being-in-the-world, yet it does pose as a preliminary "being-in-the-world-ness" which is probably necessary for Dasein's ultimate state (of being-in-the-world).
Perhaps there is a phenomenology or what-it-is-like for the embryo in the womb, but I think that existence is so fundamentally different from a born human in the world. The brain is still developing, very rapidly for at least several years, and continuing significantly for at least the age of 21. With that, consciousness likely develops as well. So, where does Dasein really begin? I would argue that Dasein appears when a human becomes able to rationalize about its own existence.
ReplyDelete